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Danger and Opportunity in Katima Mulilo: A 
Namibian Border Boomtown at Transnational 
Crossroads* 
Wolfgang Zeller 
(Institute of Development Studies, University of Helsinki) 
Rapid construction of new ‘transport corridors’ across the SADC region is supposed to 
facilitate the free ﬂow of commodities, tourism and investment between ‘valuable places’ in 
Southern Africa and global markets. Since the opening of a road bridge across the 
Zambezi in 2004, Katima Mulilo has become a busy stopover point along the Trans 
Caprivi Corridor (TCC), which links the Copperbelt of Zambia with Namibia’s sea port of 
Walvis Bay. The new transport route has at last fulﬁlled the colonial dream that motivated 
the Anglo-German exchange of territory, which originally established the ‘access corridor 
to the Zambezi’ in 1890. Katima’s current investment boom seems to give substance to the 
SWAPO government’s ofﬁcial agenda of ‘bringing development’ to Caprivi, nearly a 
decade after an armed insurgency attempted its secession. But beyond the apparent success 
story, Katima Mulilo’s boom is illustrative of a broader reconﬁguration of the nature of 
state sovereignty, engendered by two distinct but interrelated processes. One of these 
processes changes the nature of state sovereignty from ‘above’. The TCC is a space for 
global business and transnational governance over which the Namibian state authorities 
have de facto limited sovereignty. The other process changes state sovereignty from 
‘below’. It is manifest in the ﬂourishing of illegal business activities in the Namibia- 
Zambia borderland, sprawling shanty towns and other societal phenomena that challenge 
SWAPO’s idealised development agenda. The combined dynamics of opportunity for more- 
or-less legal private gain, on the one hand, and looming societal instability that 
accompany Katima Mulilo’s current boom, on the other, continue the historical pattern of 
Caprivi as a site that threatens to colonise the centre of the state from its territorial and 
social margins. 
In May 2004, a new bridge across the Zambezi River was opened at the Wenela border post, 
the main point of transit between Namibia’s Caprivi Region and Zambia’s Western Province. 
It closed the last gap in a 2,524 km-long asphalt route called the ‘Trans Caprivi Corridor’ 
(TCC). The TCC connects the Copperbelt of Zambia and the Democratic Republic of Congo 
(DRC) with Namibia’s sea-port of Walvis Bay, which advertises itself as a gateway for trade 
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Figure 1. The Trans Caprivi Corridor route showing major cities. Map edited by the author. 
between Southern Africa, Europe and the Americas1 (see Figure 1). The new Zambezi Bridge 
is located just outside the Namibian town of Katima Mulilo and its Zambian neighbour, 
Sesheke. Both towns are regional centres and both towns are booming. Over the past few 
years, they have changed from provincial backwaters to busy stopover points along a 
transport route for international business. In the no-man’s land between the border 
checkpoints and in the margins of the new truck stops, new warehouses and tourist lodges are 
visible. Small-scale traders, taxi drivers, porters and sex workers have discovered new 
opportunities to earn a living and now routinely traverse the spatial and legal boundaries of 
Namibia and Zambia. Not far from the new South African- and Chinese-owned shopping 
centres, informal markets and enterprises ﬂourish. New and older shanty towns are sprawling 
into the savannah surrounding Katima. The town’s bustling dynamism is accompanied by a 
special kind of tension characteristic of boom- and frontier towns throughout history, 
including other rapidly growing urban centres across Africa.2 It is a tension between the 
1 Namibian Port Authority, ‘About Namport’, available at http://www.namport.com/content/show.php?m¼ 2, 
  retrieved on 10 June 2007. 
2 Compare Gregor Dobler’s article in this issue. 
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wide-open opportunities for commerce and social mobility and the precarious nature of 
a situation where state and non-state regulations are very much in-the-making, sometimes in 
conﬂict, and seldom applied predictably. 
     The current boom in Katima Mulilo is clearly a new phenomenon, but one key element 
underlying this development is not new at all: Caprivi and its regional capital have been, and 
still are, located on the geographical, political and social periphery of a succession of pre- 
colonial, colonial and postcolonial states. For over a century, Caprivi has been a classical 
frontier land, a place on the edge of state power. This is illustrated by the most common 
solution to the cartographic inconvenience which Caprivi represents; it has routinely been 
cut off and re-inserted separately (often in a smaller scale) on many ofﬁcial and commercial 
maps of Namibia and its colonial predecessor, South West Africa. Over the decades, the 
perception of Caprivi as a place that is about to ‘fall off the map’ has persistently deﬁned the 
nature of the efforts made by those at the centres of government striving to bring the region 
under their control. 
     Caprivi’s precarious nature is only one side of the coin. Opportunity is the other, for with 
the heightened risk comes heightened potential for reward. Caprivi’s perceived remoteness 
has also always been its key asset. Its geographical position has alternately, sometimes 
simultaneously, served two purposes: as a bridgehead to gain access to the hinterlands and 
their resources, or a bulwark to block the intrusion of external enemies. Efforts by those at 
the centre of state power to minimise the disadvantages and maximise the opportunities run 
through Caprivi’s history like a red thread and remain central concerns today. In its current 
incarnation, Caprivi has become a thoroughfare for international business. Its key stopover 
point, Katima Mulilo is attracting exactly those activities that the Namibian government, 
donors and investors and business-minded residents of the area recognise and promote as 
‘development’. Caprivi and its regional capital are now ﬁrmly ‘on the map’ of Namibia and 
of global commerce; it has become a ‘valuable place’ for investors. This is no insigniﬁcant 
achievement for the SWAPO government. A decade ago an armed movement emerged in 
Caprivi that accused the Namibian government of deliberately marginalising Caprivi 
economically and fought – unsuccessfully – for secession and an independent state. Now it 
would seem as if this politically volatile frontier has been harnessed to the rest of the 
country. The periphery has been brought closer to the centre whose administrative muscle, in 
turn, is strengthened by its co-operation with market forces. I argue that the current boom is 
more than merely a sign that the Namibian government’s authority in Caprivi is growing. 
Instead, I see it as illustrative of a broader reconﬁguration in the nature of state sovereignty. 
This reconﬁguration is engendered by two distinct, but interrelated processes. One changes 
the nature of state sovereignty from ‘above’. It is directly visible in the way the new corridor 
route leading through Caprivi has been established: the TCC is a space for global business 
and governance over which Namibian state authorities have limited de facto sovereignty. 
The other changes state sovereignty from ‘below’. It is visible in the ﬂourishing of illegal 
business activities in the shadows of the new corridor. Both processes are eroding the 
regulatory authority of the Namibian state, but they enhance state power by providing new 
opportunities for its representatives on various levels of the administrative hierarchy.3 In the 
ﬁnal section, I describe both processes through a closer examination of the current boom in 
Katima Mulilo. 
3 Roitman makes a distinction between state regulatory authority and state power to account for what she regards 
  as a ‘paradox between the increasing intensity of unregulated activities and the persistent efﬁcacy of state 
  infrastructures’ in rural Chad. See J. Roitman, ‘Productivity in the Margins: The Reconstitution of State Power in 
  the Chad Basin’, in V. Das and D. Poole (eds), Anthropology in the Margins of the State (Santa Fe, School of 
  American Research Press and Oxford, James Currey, 2004), p. 104. 
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Two Transnational Spaces 
These two processes arise from the fact that Katima Mulilo is located at the crossroads of 
what I conceptualise as two transnational spaces. Each of these spaces has a long legacy and, 
to understand Katima’s current boom, recent changes in both need to be considered. The ﬁrst 
of these spaces is the recently completed Trans Caprivi Corridor. As I will show, it follows 
the logic of a late nineteenth century German colonial dream. It is also part of a much larger 
development, which can presently be observed throughout the member countries of the 
Southern African Development Community (SADC) and beyond. Well over a decade after 
the demise of the Apartheid regime, powerful alliances of SADC governments, foreign 
donors and private enterprises are joining forces to bring southern Africa into the mainstream 
of global transport and investment ﬂows. Whilst African leaders speak of regional 
integration, it is being effected through South African investors competing with western 
multinationals and Chinese companies who drive a 21st century scramble for the most 
lucrative markets, scenic tourist destinations, agricultural land and mineral resources on the 
continent.4 This shift does not affect all people and places across the region equally, however. 
It plays itself out with particular intensity around the nodal points of mineral resource 
extraction and tourism, production and consumption, and along the transport routes 
connecting them. All across Southern Africa, and with remarkable speed, so-called ‘transport 
corridors’ are being built from scratch or extended, upgraded and rehabilitated from existing 
rail, road, sea port and electric power infrastructure.5 Western and Chinese donors and 
contractors provide the bulk of the grants, soft and hard loans and technical know-how for 
these projects. The results are not simply physical improvements to old and new long- 
distance transport arteries. The ‘corridors’ are part of sophisticated marketing and 
management schemes such as the Walvis Bay Corridor Group, a ‘public-private partnership’ 
designed to enhance the free ﬂow of goods and investments. Its aim is to minimise inefﬁcient 
or corrupt government regulation and other ‘friction’ or ‘leakage’ along the TCC and several 
other transport routes converging on Walvis Bay.6 New transnational spaces that are both 
physical infrastructure and integrated channels of privatised governance extending across the 
boundaries of formally sovereign states are being created. These spaces are part of emerging 
worldwide networks of ‘transnational governmentality’. According to Ferguson, they 
increasingly link ‘economically valued spaces’ – resource-rich and secured enclaves that are 
‘dispersed around the world – in a point-to-point fashion’ whilst their ‘less useful’ hinterlands are 
largely neglected.7 Since the completion of the TCC, Katima Mulilo has become a major node in 
one such transnational space and Caprivi’s urban centre has become ‘useful’. 
     The other transnational space is the Namibia-Zambia borderland (Figure 2). As with the 
TCC, the borderland not only exists as a physical space but also as a site of practices of 
governance. To describe its fundamental characteristics I ﬁnd the concept of margins of the 
4 H. Melber, ‘The New Scramble for Africa’s Resources’, available at http://www.alternatives.ca/article2793.html, 
  retrieved on 12 June 2007. 
5 Other examples are the Trans Kalahari Corridor, Trans Cunene Corridor, Trans Oranje Corridor, rehabilitation of 
  the Benguela Railway, Maputo Corridor, Lubito Corridor, Beira Corridor, Mtwara Development Corridor, 
  numerous individual road and bridge projects under construction in Zambia, Malawi and Mozambique and a 
  ‘Copper Corridor’ through Angola, supposed to connect Zambia’s copper mines directly to the Angolan port of 
                                   ¨Lubito by 2010 (Bundesagentur fur Außenwirtschaft, 12 May 2006, ‘Sambia plant “Kupfer 
Korridor” durch 
                                                                                 ¨Angola’, retrieved on 4 August 2006 from 
http://www.bfai.de). See also F. Soderbaum and I. Taylor (eds), 
  Regionalism and Uneven Development in Southern Africa: The Case of the Maputo Development Corridor 
  (Aldershot, Ashgate Publishing, 2003). 
6 WBCG, ‘About Us’, available at http://www.wbcg.com.na/wbcg/about/aboutus.htm, retrieved on 17 July 2007. 
7 J. Ferguson, Global Shadows: Africa in the Neoliberal World Order (Durham, NC and London, Duke University 
  Press, 2006), p. 40. 
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state, developed by Das and Poole, useful.8 In the way that rules are deﬁned by their 
exceptions, sovereign state authority deﬁnes itself through that which it excludes by 
demarcating and enforcing the margins of legality, its territory and its citizenry. Yet the 
fundamental nature of these margins is that here these deﬁnitions are continuously contested. 
Margins are often territorial peripheries as seen from the centre of state power. More 
generally, Das and Poole emphasise, they are sites and situations where ‘law and other state 
practices are colonised by other forms of regulation’.9 This deﬁnition of margins aptly 
characterises the realities of daily life in the Namibia-Zambia borderland. The physical 
condition of the border landscape and the social networks of its inhabitants make it largely 
impenetrable to the state’s regulatory authority. Westward from Wenela the boundary is a 
straight line running over solid ground through dense bush for 75 km until it intersects with 
the Zambia-Angola border. It is demarcated and accompanied by a forest cutline, but not 
fenced and only lightly patrolled. East of Wenela the border follows the central channel of the 
Zambezi for about 100 km until it terminates at the junction of the borders of Namibia, 
Zambia, Botswana and Zimbabwe, (see Figure 3) where the river meanders through a maze of 
islands. By day, but especially in the shelter of darkness, the population engages in a lively 
cross-border trade in both legally acquired and stolen commodities. They operate through 
closely-knit and long-standing personal networks that have straddled the international 
boundary since before its colonial invention in 1890, when Britain and Germany partitioned 
the Lozi kingdom. As in other African borderlands, the presence of the boundary itself over 
time has become a central economic and political factor motivating the movement of goods 
and people across it.10 Trade is conducted in ways that are often ofﬁcially illegal, but widely 
considered as licit by those engaged in them.11 Police, customs and other frontline agents of 
the state on both sides of the border make only sporadic attempts at controlling the movement 
of people and commodities across the international boundary. Where they do, moreover, it is 
not necessarily to enforce ofﬁcial concepts of law and order, but often to top up their salaries. 
Life realities in the borderland thus encroach upon the practices of frontline agents of the 
state. The margins are colonising the centre. 
    The integrated cross-border economy is, however, itself undergoing a process of change. 
As in other parts of Africa, parallel commodity chains connecting producers and consumers 
thousands of kilometres apart are strengthened, expanded or newly emerging in the wake of 
the new long-distance corridor route.12 Katima Mulilo is becoming an increasingly important 
link in such chains. 
 8 V. Das and D. Poole, ‘State and Its Margins: Comparative Ethnographies’, in V. Das and D. Poole (eds), 
   Anthropology in the Margins of the State (Santa Fe, School of American Research Press and Oxford, James 
   Currey, 2004), pp. 3–33. 
 9 Ibid., p. 8. 
10 A.I. Asiwaju, Western Yorubaland Under European Rule: A Comparative Analysis of French and British 
   Colonialism (New York, Humanities Press, 1976); W.F.S. Miles, Hausaland Divided: Colonialism and 
   Independence in Nigeria and Niger (Ithaca, NY, Cornell University Press, 1994); D.K. Flynn, ‘We are the 
   Border: Identity, Exchange, and the State along the Benin-Nigeria Border’, American Ethnologist, 24, 2 (May 
   1997), pp. 311–31; P. Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists and Loyal Citizens on the Ghana-Togo Frontier: The Lie 
   of the Borderlands Since 1914 (Oxford, James Currey, 2002); H. Englund, From War to Peace on the 
   Mozambique-Malawi Borderland (Edinburgh, Edinburgh University Press, 2002); B. Chalﬁn, ‘Border Zone 
   Trade and the Economic Boundaries of the State in North-East Ghana’, Africa, 71, 2 (2001), pp. 202–24; 
   E. Kreike, Re-creating Eden: Land-Use, Environment and Society in Southern Angola and Northern Namibia 
   (Portsmouth, NH, Heinemann, 2004). 
11 Compare W. van Schendel and I. Abraham, ‘Introduction: the Making of Illicitness’, in W. van Schendel and 
   I. Abraham (eds), Illicit Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders and the Other Side of Globalization 
   (Bloomington, Indiana University Press, 2005), pp. 1–37; Roitman, ‘Productivity in the Margins’, p. 218. 
12 See K. Meagher, ‘Manufacturing Disorder: Informal Enterprise and Economic Ungovernance in African Small- 
   ﬁrm Clusters’, Development and Change, 38, 3 (May 2007), pp. 473– 503. See also Dobler in this volume. 
Danger and Opportunity in Katima Mulilo 139 
Figure 3. Katima Mulilo in 1972 and 2008. The rectangular-shaped residential area in the centre of the older image is 
Ngweze. North of Ngweze, and along the main road the recent construction boom is visible. South and Southeast of 
Ngweze are new formal residential areas and adjacent squatter camps. West of the main road crop production with 
irrigation is visible in place of the former Wenela air strip. The new bridge, Wenela border post with adjacent squatter 
camps and boundary cutline (now mostly overgrown) are visible in the upper left corner. The river islands between 
Katima Mulilo and Sesheke are partly submerged during high water and used by smugglers as informal ‘export 
processing zones’. Source: author. 
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    The transnational spaces of the transport corridor and the borderland share some 
important features. Largely uninhibited by local and national-level state representatives (and 
sometimes with their active endorsement), commodities move through both spaces across the 
Namibia-Zambia border. Both spaces are neither entirely removed from attempts at 
government regulation, nor under the full control of sovereign state authority. Both spaces 
provide opportunities, but are also potentially problematic for the Namibian (and Zambian) 
state authorities at various levels of the administrative hierarchy. However, as I show, there 
are important differences in how state authorities relate to them. 
Danger and Opportunity 
The corridor is an opportunity for high-level representatives of the Namibian and Zambian 
governments to ally themselves with private investors and donor governments. Both serves 
their own private business interests, but also brings highly visible, politically rewarding 
‘development’ to peripheral and previously neglected parts of their countries. This has helped 
to counter the claims of separatist movements in both Caprivi and Western Province that 
posed internal challenges to the formation of the two postcolonial states. 
     Nevertheless, the alliance with powerful global players and market forces has potential 
drawbacks for the two governments. Achille Mbembe observes the emergence of extractive 
structures and mechanisms in Africa whose overall internal logic, proﬁtability, ‘requires the 
exit of the state [ . . . ] and its replacement by fragmented forms of sovereignty’.13 He argues 
that one aspect of this trend is the establishment of ‘extra-territories’ that are welcoming to 
investors, including transport corridors and tax-free zones through which goods can move 
largely uninhibited by government regulation.14 Ferguson and Reno argue that state 
sovereignty in this situation is no longer grounded in the actual ability of central governments 
to exercise effective control and maintain a monopoly of legitimate violence over the entire 
state territory; instead, the simple provision of contractual legal authority to legitimise the 
extractive work of transnational ﬁrms becomes sufﬁcient.15 According to Ferguson, the new 
forms of transnational governmentality, which emerge as part of these new ways of doing 
business in and with Africa, do not replace state authority, but overlay and coexist with it.16 
African leaders are tuning in to the dominant discourse of the ‘development industry’, urging 
them to participate in an ‘inevitable process of globalisation’ and surrender themselves to 
‘ceding some elements of sovereignty’.17 In this sense, the new corridor is an opportunity, but 
it entails the danger of a hollowed-out sovereignty with limited scope for decision-making by 
the representatives of the state in Windhoek and Lusaka. 
     Likewise, the transnational space of the borderland is ‘dangerous’, but it also entails 
opportunities for representatives of the state. If sovereignty is constituted through deﬁning the 
margins of the state then failure to control these margins is dangerous to the centre. Between 
13 A. Mbembe, ‘Ways of Seeing: Beyond the New Nativism. Introduction’, African Studies Review, 44, 2 
   (September 2001), p. 4; see also A. Mbembe, On the Postcolony (Berkley, University of California Press, 2001); 
   A. Mbembe, ‘At the Edge of the World: Boundaries, Territoriality, and Sovereignty in Africa’, Public Culture, 
   12, 1 (January 2000), p. 284. 
14 Mbembe, ‘Ways of Seeing’, p. 5. 
15 Ferguson, Global Shadows, p. 207; W. Reno, ‘How Sovereignty Matters: International Markets and the Political 
   Economy of Local Politics in Weak States’, in T.M. Callaghy, R. Kassimir and R. Latham (eds), Intervention and 
   Transnationalism in Africa: Global-Local Networks of Power (New York, Cambridge University Press, 2001), 
   pp. 197 –215. 
16 Ferguson, Global Shadows, p. 103. 
17 K.Y. Amoako, Executive Secretary UN Economic Commission for Africa (9 December 1999), available at http:// 
   www.uneca.org/eca_resources/speeches/amoako/99/120999speech_kyamoako_ecowas.htm, retrieved on 28 
   June 2007; B. Love, ‘OECD Jobs Report Shows Darker Side of Globalisation’, Reuters Africa (19 June 
   2007), available at http://africa.reuters.com/business/news/usnBAN945342.html, retrieved on 28 June 2007. 
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the ‘extra-territories’, Mbembe and others argue, exist ‘zones of ﬂux’ and informality, often 
found in urban areas and the proximity of international boundaries.18 From the point of view 
of central government the activities and ‘twilight institutions’19 which thrive in the 
transnational space of the borderland are, at best, ambiguous. They smell of subversion and 
threaten the order that postcolonial state authority represents. In the Namibia-Zambia 
borderland they seem all the more volatile due to the area’s history of separatist tendencies, 
high HIV infection rates,20 natural disaster, and geographical and cultural distance from the 
centres of power in Windhoek and Lusaka. Against this background illegal activities such as 
smuggling and unsanctioned cross-border movement pose a threat to the ability of central 
state authority to rein-in the periphery. On the other hand, the activity of criminalising the 
traders and trespassers and enforcing border controls is also an opportunity for state authority. 
They are publicly seen as doing what Agamben considers fundamental to sovereignty: 
performing the act of exclusion and inscribing sovereign power onto the bodies of the 
excluded.21 And, less visibly, alongside the new parallel commodity chains, new 
opportunities emerge for frontline representatives of the state to augment their own salaries 
in the shadows of ofﬁcial state regulation. 
    In what follows, I examine the way in which the twin themes of opportunity and ‘danger’ 
have consistently been faced by external centres of power when trying to impose their 
domination on the area: ﬁrst for the colonial German state when it sought to incorporate 
Caprivi in German Southwest Africa;22 then through the early decades of Katima Mulilo’s 
development as a peripheral administrative headquarters; through its rapid growth into a 
Bantustan capital and strategic forward position for the apartheid military; and in its current 
transformation into a border boom town at the crossroads of two transnational spaces. 
An Access Corridor to the Zambezi: The Caprivi Zipfel under 
German Rule 
Germany acquired what is now Namibia’s Caprivi Region in 1890 as part of the territorial 
swap with Britain known as the Heligoland-Zanzibar Treaty.23 In the spirit of contemporary 
Cape-to-Cairo dreams the ‘access corridor to the Zambezi’24 inspired German hopes for a 
                                                                              ¨direct land connection 
stretching from the existing protectorate of Deutsch Sudwest Afrika 
(DSWA) to the interior of Southern Africa and the German territories in East Africa. DSWA 
18 Mbembe, ‘Ways of Seeing’, p. 5; T.B. Hansen and F. Stepputat, ‘Introduction’, in T.B. Hansen and F. Stepputat 
   (eds), Sovereign Bodies: Citizens, Migrants, and States in the Postcolonial World (Princeton and Oxford, 
   Princeton University Press, 2005), pp. 1–38; W. van Schendel and I. Abraham, ‘Spaces of Engagement: How 
   Borderlands, Illicit Flows, and Territorial States Interlock’, in W. van Schendel and I. Abraham (eds), Illicit 
   Flows and Criminal Things: States, Borders and the Other Side of Globalization (Bloomington, Indiana 
   University Press, 2005), pp. 38–68; M. Niger-Thomas, ‘Women and the Arts of Smuggling’, African Studies 
   Review, 44, 2 (September 2001), pp. 43–71; Nugent, Smugglers, Secessionists & Loyal Citizens. 
19 C. Lund, ‘Twilight Institutions: An Introduction’, Development and Change, 37, 4 (July 2006), pp. 673– 84. 
20 IRIN Plusnews, May 30 2006, ‘Namibia: Curbing HIV/AIDS along a transport corridor, retrieved 10 July 2006 
   from http://www.plusnews.org 
21 G. Agamben, Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Bare Life (Stanford, Stanford University Press, 1998). 
22 The dynamics of danger and opportunity were already an integral part of the Lozi kingdom’s rulers’ attitudes and 
   strategies with respect to their Southeastern frontier, the present-day Namibia-Zambia borderland. For further 
   details, see W. Zeller and B. Kangumu, ‘Caprivi Under Old and New Indirect Rule: Falling off the Map or a 19th 
   Century Dream Come True?’, in H. Melber (ed.), Transitions in Namibia – Which Changes for Whom? (Uppsala, 
   Nordic Africa Institute, 2007), pp. 190–208; L. Flint, ‘Historical Constructions of Postcolonial Citizenship and 
   Subjectivity: The Case of the Lozi Peoples of Southern Central Africa’ (PhD thesis, University of Birmingham, 
   2004), pp. 114, 256; M. Mainga, Bulozi Under the Luyana Kings: Political Evolution and State Formation in Pre- 
   colonial Zambia (London, Longman, 1973), pp. 133, 154. 
23 The ofﬁcial name of the document is ‘Anglo-German Agreement of 1890’. 
24 Anglo-German agreement of 1890, Article III. 2. 
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also needed water and labour resources and, via the corridor, both seemed available in great 
abundance. Such hopes were soon disappointed. The swampy territory was too distant from 
established German outposts and remained without a colonial administration for nearly two 
decades. Its value was openly questioned in the colony and the Reich resulting in the sardonic 
name Caprivi Zipfel.25 Initially a form of popular mockery surrounding the Heligoland- 
Zanzibar Treaty and the person of Chancellor Leo von Caprivi, it gradually came into 
everyday use in Germany in the early years of the twentieth century, eventually ﬁnding its 
way into publications and ofﬁcial documents.26 
    From 1905, the aggressive political expansionism of Kaiser Wilhelm II led to a more 
vigorous exploration of the Reich’s overseas territories for raw material production and 
trade.27 After the genocidal war against the Herero and Nama (1904 –1908), German 
                                                                                 ¨settlement surged in 
DSWA and diamond deposits were discovered near Luderitzbucht, 
creating an urgent need for increased indigenous labour supplies. The colonial lobby’s 
publications and newspapers in DSWA also speculated about possible deposits of coal, 
diamonds and copper in the Caprivizipfel.28 During the same period, the British High 
Commissioner in South Africa repeatedly urged that the German authorities establish police 
control in the area to ‘clean up’ what both sides had come to regard as a lawless zone.29 
Caprivi’s commercial opportunities had attracted a colourful population of traders, 
prospectors and other white frontiersmen, among them individuals who had been uprooted 
and displaced by the Second South African War. They were allegedly decimating the 
abundant wildlife, trading ﬁrearms and alcohol with the natives, or claiming to represent the 
German government.30 These were not issues of peripheral importance: the European 
colonial powers were at the time debating the best methods of managing the overseas 
territories and their settler and native populations. German massacres in DSWA and the 
Anglo-Boer conﬂicts had exposed the difﬁculties facing colonial states in trying to impose 
their rule over the territorial and social margins of their colonies. The state of affairs in 
Caprivi thus directly undermined the credibility and viability of the colonial endeavour as a 
civilising mission of Europeans in Africa. In the German colonies the preservation and 
cultivation of Deutschtum (Germanness) among settler colonists was regarded as an essential 
goal.31 Whites corrupting natives or ‘going native’ themselves embodied the antithesis to the 
civilising mission. They were considered to be dangerous and needing to be either excluded 
from society or reined in. The margins had to be policed. 
    After an arduous three-month journey by Hauptmann Kurt Streitwolf and 17 troops, the 
German ﬂag was ﬁnally hoisted at Schuckmannsburg on the banks of the Zambezi in February 
1909. Besides policing, Streitwolf had the task of setting up a functioning administration and 
25 
26 
27 
28 
   Allgemeine Zeitung 1907–08. 
   For further details see Zeller and Kangumu, ‘Caprivi under Indirect Rule’, p. 194. 
                          ¨G. Sandner and M. Rossler, Geography and Empire (Oxford, Blackwell, 1994), p. 118. 
   This was the rationale for Seiner’s expedition to the Okavango and Zambezi in 1905–06 (see F. Seiner 1909, 
   ‘Ergebnisse einer Bereisung des Gebietes zwischen Okawango und Sambesi (Caprivi-Zipfel) in den Jahren 1905 
   und 1906’, Mitteilungen aus den Schutzgebieten, 22, 1 (January 1909), pp. 2–106; F. Seiner, ‘Die 
                                                     ¨¨wirtschaftsgeographischen und politischen Verhaltnisse des 
Captivizipfels’, Zeitschrift fur Kolonialpolitik, 
                                                                              ¨Kolonialrecht und Kolonialwirtschaft, 11 (1909), 
pp. 419–21; see also Erklarungen des Professors Dr. Hahn in 
   der Sitzung der Kommission vom 12. Dezember 1906, Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 18, 2 (January 1907), pp. 25, 73; 
                                  ¨¨¨¨M. Fisch, Der Caprivizipfel wahrend der deutschen Zeit 1890–1914 (Koln, Rudiger Koppe 
Verlag, 1996), p. 16. 
29 No Author, ‘Der Caprivi-Zipfel’, Deutsches Kolonialblatt, 19 (1908), p. 1,153. 
30 Contemporary sources ostracised them as ‘lichtscheue Weisse Elemente’: ‘white elements avoiding the light of 
                                                                                  ¨¨day’ (N.A., ‘Der Caprivi-Zipfel’, p. 1,152); 
and ‘weisses Gesindel – Aasjager und direkt dem Gefangnis 
   entsprungene Verbrecher’: ‘white good-for-nothings – poachers and prison escapees’. See K. Streitwolf, Der 
                            ¨Caprivizipfel (Berlin, Susseroth, 1911), p. 1. 
31 D.J. Walther, Creating Germans Abroad: Cultural Policies and National Identity in Namibia (Athens, OH, Ohio 
   University Press, 2002). 
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exploring the territory’s geography and economic potential.32 Streitwolf installed two 
paramount chiefs over the Fwe and the Subiya as his direct administrative counterparts. He 
reported some progress in expelling illegal white settlers, no traces of valuable minerals, an 
unhealthy climate for European settlement and the Zipfel’s only moderate potential as a labour 
reserve.33 Difﬁcult transport access remained the decisive constraint to realising this potential 
before the outbreak of the First World War abruptly ended the brief German presence in 
Caprivi. The dual chieftaincy introduced by Streitwolf, however, was to survive beyond 
Namibian independence as the basis of regional and local administration. 
Katima Mulilo: From Contract Labour Hub to Apartheid Garrison 
Town 
The Versailles Conference brought Caprivi, along with the rest of South West Africa (SWA), 
under the League of Nations Mandate handed to South Africa. Between 1919 and 1939 
responsibility for the administration of all or parts of the Caprivi Strip was passed back and 
forth several times between various administrators in South Africa, SWA and the surrounding 
British colonies. Their geographical location made Caprivi and the adjacent Barotseland 
Province of Northern Rhodesia peripheral to developments along the line of rail, native 
labour being their key asset. By the end of the 1920s, contract labour bureaus were hiring tens 
of thousands of Lozis who worked and lived in ethnically segregated communities in all the 
major mining centres of South Africa and the Rhodesias.34 
    In 1935, ﬂood-prone Schuckmannsburg was abandoned in favour of a new administrative 
centre 70 km upstream at Katima Mulilo. Four years later the outbreak of the Second World 
War highlighted the strategic location of the Caprivi Strip in the heart of Southern Africa and 
Pretoria took over its direct administration.35 A Special Company of the Native Military 
Corps was based at Katima in 1940 to reinforce protection of the Victoria Falls Bridge near 
Livingstone 200 km downstream. In the same year, the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association (WNLA or Wenela) built the ﬁrst air strip near the town. By then hundreds of 
Caprivi men were joining the stream of Lozi labourers setting off from across the Zambezi 
every year. The airstrip instantly became Caprivi’s most important military and civilian link 
to South Africa and SWA. In the years following, Katima Mulilo grew gradually and 
modestly. New ofﬁces and housing for a Native Commissioner and other basic administrative 
facilities were constructed. A Catholic mission from Northern Rhodesia expanded existing 
health and education facilities. But for postal and banking services Katima’s residents had to 
cross the Zambezi to Sesheke. The South African administrators perceived the Caprivi Strip to 
be unsuitable for white settlement and low in commercial potential and consequently 
continued Streitwolf’s cost-efﬁcient administrative model of a dual chieftainship under the 
supervision of one white government ofﬁcer. 
    The end of Caprivi’s existence as a remote, sleepy backwater came in 1963. Following the 
Odendaal Commission’s recommendation of a roadmap towards a self-governing homeland, 
the South African administration began to implement large-scale, ﬁnancially costly plans for 
direct government-driven development in the Strip. Katima Mulilo, the designated seat of the 
future ‘bantustan government’, saw an unprecedented inﬂow of white ofﬁcials and 
inhabitants from the region tasked with steering developmental efforts. Zambia had just 
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Ibid., pp. 229– 34. 
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attained independence when work began in November 1964 on a new layout of Katima 
Mulilo as an apartheid town. The authorities demolished several villages and relocated their 
inhabitants inside the new town boundaries where developments included administrative and 
service headquarters and adjacent areas set aside for white settlement, commerce, and the 
segregated black township Ngweze. 
    Over the ensuing years, Caprivi men and women were sent for training in government 
services to South Africa. In the rural parts of Caprivi, government built up health services, road 
infrastructure, ﬁre and wildlife management, animal husbandry, boreholes and irrigation. 
At considerable cost, the ﬁrst unpaved road connections to Katima from the Botswana border 
at Ngoma and from Rundu through Western Caprivi were bulldozed through the dense bush. In 
1969, postal and telegraph services were directly connected to South Africa. Eastern Caprivi 
was ﬁnally inaugurated as a South African Bantu homeland with a Legislative Council in 
1972. Four years later, a Caprivi ‘government’ was formed, complete with a constitution, 
regulations for ‘Caprivian’ citizenship, a state ﬂag and national anthem. The Legislative 
Council consisted of the Fwe and Subiya chiefs and their councillors, who received salaries. 
    By then Ngweze had grown from a residential area with one primary school in 1965 to an 
apartheid township (see Figure 2). It had secondary-level schools, teacher training colleges 
and vocational schools with boarding facilities and several denominational churches. The 
Bantu Investment Corporation (BIC) had started various business enterprises and an open 
market. New Look was established as an additional township in 1978, and by 1979 Katima 
Mulilo ofﬁcially counted 4,600 inhabitants (including 575 whites), compared to about 500 in 
1963, of which 148 were whites.36 
    The actual number of Katima Mulilo’s black residents was, however, much higher than 
these ﬁgures suggest, as numerous shanty towns mushroomed in the vicinity of government 
installations.37 The townships and shanty towns also became fertile ground for ideas of black 
emancipation, often introduced by Caprivi residents returning from work or government 
training in Zambia and South Africa. The white authorities observed these developments with 
great suspicion. The benign side of strong, government-driven development in Caprivi was 
thus, from the outset, accompanied by political and security concerns, which gradually 
moved centre-stage over the following years. The Caprivi African National Union (CANU) 
was formed in 1963 with the aim of achieving self-government for the Caprivi Strip. Its ﬁrst 
President, Brendan Simbwaye, was arrested in 1964 and subsequently disappeared at the 
hands of the South Africans.38 Mishake Muyongo, another leading member of CANU and a 
prominent member of the Fwe royal family39 escaped arrest and ﬂed to newly-independent 
Zambia with a group of CANU activists, meeting leading members of SWAPO in Lusaka in 
November 1964 where Muyongo agreed to a SWAPO-CANU merger. Nowadays he 
maintains that SWAPO president Sam Nujoma promised that Caprivi would be granted 
either special political status or complete autonomy after Namibia’s independence.40 
SWAPO disputes this claim today, but the issue played a vital role in the emergence of the 
Caprivi secessionist movement of the late 1990s, which Muyongo masterminded. 
                                                                                   ¨36 K.-G. Schneider and W. Richter, 
Kavango und Ostcaprivi. Periphere Wirtschaftsraume im Entwicklungsland 
                                 ¨¨ ¨Namibia. Geostudien 13/91 (Koln, Universitat Koln, 1991), pp. 130, 133. 
37 According to Bennett Kangumu Kangumu they were known by their inhabitants as by such names as Piggery, 
   Coloureds, Dairy, Mission, Forestry, Lewis, Mahohoma, and Mafulo. 
38 Kangumu, A Forgotten Corner of Namibia. 
39 Mishake Muyongo is a direct descendant of Fwe chief Simataa Mamili, who had been appointed by Lozi king 
   Lewanika and was recognised by Streitwolf as the ﬁrst Fwe chief in Caprivi in 1909. See M. Fisch, The 
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    SWAPO’s military wing, the People’s Liberation Army of Namibia (PLAN) employed 
hit-and-run tactics such as ambushes, laying landmines and sabotage of infrastructure in 
Caprivi from the late 1960s onwards. South Africa responded with a heavy military build-up, 
and constructed major army bases, including Omega III in Western Caprivi. In 1965, the 
Mpacha military airﬁeld was built 25 km outside Katima Mulilo. The Caprivi Strip thereafter 
began to play an important role in South Africa’s regional destabilisation policy aimed at 
blocking the perceived encroachment of hostile governments and guerrilla movements. At the 
hands of the military planners, the former access corridor was transformed into a strategic 
forward position where SADF trained specialised secret military units, like Koevoet, and 
launched cross-border raids into Zambia and Angola. 
    The military build-up fuelled further service and infrastructure development and 
generated additional business and employment locally. It also transformed Katima Mulilo 
into a garrison town of the SADF: a base located near the centre was hit in a rocket attack on 
23 August 1978, killing ten SADF soldiers and wounding ten more.41 The townscape of 
Katima Mulilo changed as SADF built bunkers and other structures to shield residents and 
government installations. In pursuit of suspected SWAPO activists the South African 
authorities turned to terrorising the black population – SADF increasingly had disciplinary 
problems with soldiers going on shooting rampages.42 Despite efforts to impose tight controls 
along the border with Zambia, many ‘Caprivians’ migrated to the neighbouring country to 
work or join the liberation struggle in exile; others ﬂocked to Katima’s growing shanty towns 
and associated with soldiers and government employees. 
    In the late 1970s, the rear bases and theatre of SWAPO’s guerrilla war shifted to Southern 
Angola. Caprivi remained of strategic relevance, but the apartheid regime’s ability to sustain 
the costly development efforts introduced during the 1960s declined. A phase of stagnation 
and contraction of governmental services set in and continued until Namibian independence 
in 1990. 
    Following the German era, the Caprivi Strip’s key asset for its South African 
administrators remained its forward location in the centre of southern Africa, despite the 
gradual redeﬁnition of its value from economic to mainly military-strategic considerations. 
From its intended role as a thoroughfare, the Strip mutated into a bridgehead and ﬁrst line of 
defence. Technology and the administrative muscle of the apartheid regime overcame the 
problems posed by geographic distance. Yet the social transformations induced by 
the Odendaal Plan also saw another pattern re-emerge: the former lawless frontier zone 
that the Germans had felt compelled to ‘clean up’ in 1908 now produced new enemies from 
within – an organised political opposition among the black population, disciplinary problems 
within the army and informal urban sprawl with its associated social ‘disorder’. Caprivi and 
Katima Mulilo thus not only came geographically closer to the centre of South Africa’s 
administrative power; the Bantustan and its capital also gave rise to social phenomena that its 
white administrators sought to stamp out because they were seen to threaten the very nature of 
the apartheid system. The margins once again ‘colonised’ the centre. 
Putting Katima Mulilo on the Map since Independence 
When the SADF withdrew their troops from the area in the run-up to Namibian 
independence in 1990, a signiﬁcant part of the income opportunities in Katima Mulilo and 
41 P. Stiff, The Silent War (Johannesburg, Galago, 1999), p. 205. 
42 According to several Caprivi inhabitants the region’s rich wildlife was jointly decimated by local poachers and 
   SADF soldiers and some valuable specimens were allegedly captured and airlifted to South Africa for re-sale. 
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the region were lost.43 This was compounded by the return of hundreds of exiles from 
Zambia and other countries in the early 1990s. Expectations of rapid economic change were 
high among the ‘previously disadvantaged’, fuelled by SWAPO’s promises in the run-up to 
independence. In a climate of frustration and competition for scarce opportunities, long- 
standing rifts between ‘traditional’ and political party leaders and their supporters became 
more pronounced during the 1990s and eventually broke out in open violence. Following a 
security crackdown after the ﬁrst evidence of an organised secessionist movement emerged, 
some 2,500 Caprivi residents ﬂed to Botswana in 1998. On 2 August 1999, armed militants 
calling themselves the ‘Caprivi Liberation Army’ launched attacks on Namibian government 
installations in Caprivi, resulting in 15 casualties. President Nujoma declared a state of 
emergency in the region, which lasted three weeks. Namibian security forces pursued 
suspected secessionist sympathisers throughout Caprivi, making hundreds of arrests inside 
and outside Namibian territory and using torture and unauthorised extradition. In (probably 
unrelated) incidents in late 1999 and 2000, cross-border raids into the Caprivi and Kavango 
regions by UNITA ﬁghters from Angola led to several casualties among motorists driving 
along the TCC. For months, military convoys were the only safe option for road travel 
between Katima Mulilo and the rest of Namibia. Construction work on sections of the TCC, 
and business and development projects in Caprivi came to a virtual standstill until mid-2000, 
when the situation normalised. 
     The secessionist call for a separate ‘Caprivian State’ continues to make occasional 
headlines in the Namibian press.44 The radical core of the movement appears to be a spent 
force, however. Its leadership is either dead, in exile or on trial in court cases bogged down 
by endless technicalities. Whether or not their cause will regain momentum remains to be 
seen. What is undoubted, though, is the SWAPO government’s experience of Caprivi 
politics as a potential threat to Namibia’s territorial integrity, its ofﬁcial version of liberation 
history, and its rhetoric of national reconciliation. In general, Namibia’s ruling party has 
shown little tolerance towards dissenting opinion within and outside SWAPO.45 Heavy- 
handed coercive measures dominated the Namibian state security forces’ dealings with the 
Caprivi uprising and its aftermath. However, in recent years the SWAPO government has 
made progress in bringing Caprivi back into the national fold through rhetorical appeals to 
its regional leaders and population,46 visible acts of ‘emergency relief’47 and ‘sustainable 
43 The deployment of United Nations and later Namibian Defence Force troops could only buffer out a fraction of 
   these changes. For Western Caprivi, compare J. Taylor, ‘The Politics of Identity, Authority and the Environment: 
   San, NGOs and the State in Namibia’s West Caprivi’ (PhD thesis, University of Oxford, forthcoming 2008). 
44 Examples are a pro-secessionist opinion piece published in Caprivi Vision, 1 September 2005, the controversy over 
   the revival of the United Democratic Party (UDP) (The Namibian, 28 July and 8 September 2006, available at http:// 
   www.namibian.com.na/archives/index.html; Allgemeine Zeitung, 4 September 2006, available at http://www.az. 
   com.na/interaktiv/archiv/suche.20154.php?q¼ 1; New Era, 4 and 5 September 2006, available at http://www. 
   newera.com.na/). The surfacing of a document which Caprivi separatists claim proves that the 1964 CANU- 
   SWAPO merger was agreed on the condition that Caprivi would become an independent state separate from 
   Namibia (The Namibian, 24 January 2007), and the repeated public claims by accused and acquitted high treason 
   suspects that Caprivi is historically ‘not part of Namibia’ (The Namibian, 2 February 2005; 17 January 2007, 17 
   April 2007 and 14 June 2007). 
45 For example, regarding the SWAPO detainee issue, the emergence of opposition parties Congress of Democrats 
   and Rally for Democracy and Progress, and the National Society for Human Rights. 
46 SWAPO leaders frequently refer to Caprivi as a potential ‘bread basket of the Nation’ (New Era, 4 July 2006). At 
   the 2006 Heroes’ Day celebrations in Katima Mulilo president Pohamba declared ‘the Caprivi Region played a 
   signiﬁcant role in the national liberation of our motherland’ and singled out a number of local ‘heroes and 
   heroines’ of the armed struggle (H. Pohamba, ‘Statement on the Occasion of Heroes Day Commemoration’, 
   26 August 2006, available at http://www.grnnet.gov.na/grnnews.html, retrieved on 17 July 2007). 
47 In 2003, 2004 and 2007 ﬂood relief operations brought high-proﬁle government delegations and extensive media 
   coverage to Caprivi. While some homes, livestock and crops were lost, the dominant rhetoric of ‘catastrophe’ 
   exaggerated government’s role in saving a population that has lived with the Zambezi’s natural annual ﬂood cycle for 
   centuries. 
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development’.48 The Zambezi bridge and Caprivi’s connection to the national tar road grid 
are testament to the material and symbolic shifts the SWAPO government is aiming for. 
These examples also highlight the strategic alliances SWAPO has made to achieve these 
shifts. I have argued elsewhere that this ‘development’ is a tool used by the Namibian and 
Zambian governments to appeal to important political power brokers among the ‘traditional 
leaders’ on both sides of the borderland.49 Here, I will focus on those who built and ﬁnanced 
the new infrastructure and the creation of the transnational space of the transport corridor, 
namely international investors and development aid donors. 
    The 877 m long Zambezi Bridge has replaced a notoriously unreliable pontoon. Until 
April 2004, this contraption represented the only option for light vehicles to cross directly 
between Namibia and Zambia. At Sesheke, the new bridge connects with a 205 km highway 
to Livingstone, which was rebuilt and tarred in 2004. Until then, the frequent accidents and 
breakdowns along this deteriorating regional trafﬁc artery had earned it the reputation of a 
‘road of death’ among the population of the area. On its southern side the bridge connects 
with a 400 km section of the TCC running through the Caprivi Region, which was upgraded 
between the mid-1990s and 2004. German-based engineering and construction companies 
designed and built the bridge and both roads.50 The German KfW Bankengruppe51 provided 
the bulk of the funding as part of their development co-operation with the Zambian and 
Namibian governments.52 Among the many motives for this development, the most important 
is the Copperbelt. Growing demand in China, India and other rapidly industrialising 
economies has caused a more than fourfold increase in the world market price for copper 
since 2003.53 Transport access to Africa’s largest deposits of the metal is a matter of keen 
interest among buyers worldwide.54 Walvis Bay is ﬁve to seven shipping days closer to 
Europe and the Americas than Dar es Salaam and Durban, which are thus far the main exit 
ports serving the Copperbelt.55 Namibian and foreign investments have greatly expanded 
Walvis Bay harbour’s capacity with new state-of-the-art container handling and dock 
facilities in recent years. Since the opening of the Zambezi Bridge, trucks carrying copper ore 
concentrate from the Australian-Canadian owned Dikulushi mine in the south-eastern 
Democratic Republic of Congo drive along the TCC through Zambia into Namibia.56 
48 In recent election campaigns in Zambia and Namibia, candidates of both countries’ ruling parties have 
   emphasised the infrastructural development they claim to have brought to Caprivi and Western Province. 
49 W. Zeller, ‘“Now We are a Town”: Chiefs, Investors, and the State in Zambia’s Western Province’, in L. Buur 
   and H.M. Kyed (eds), State Recognition and Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa: A New Dawn for 
   Traditional Authorities? (New York, Palgrave, 2007), pp. 209–31; W. Zeller, ‘Chiefs, Policing and Vigilantes: 
   “Cleaning Up” the Caprivi Borderland of Namibia’, in L. Buur and H.M. Kyed (eds), State Recognition and 
   Democratisation in Sub-Saharan Africa, pp. 79 –104. 
50 Examples are the German engineering company JBG Gauff Ingenieure, which designed the Zambezi bridge and 
   CONCOR (until February 2005 held to 44.99 per cent by German-based construction multinational Hochtief), 
   which built the bridge, Livingstone-Sesheke road and several other sections of the corridor road. 
                                   ¨51 KfW stands for Kreditanstalt fur Wiederaufbau. The Reconstruction Credit Institute was 
formed after the Second 
   World War as part of the Marshall Plan, and is under shared ownership by the German federal (Bund) and state 
      ¨(Lander) governments. 
52 JBG Gauff Ingenieure, Bridging the Gap, (Frankfurt, H.P. Gauff Ingenieure, 2004), p. 5; K. Dierks, ‘The History 
   of the Zambezi Bridge from Namibia to Zambia: 1982–2004’, available at http://www.klausdierks.com, 
   retrieved on 20 September 2006. 
53 http://www.econbrowser.com/archives/2006/01/soaring_commodi.html, retrieved on 5 April 2008. 
54 A. Goldstein et al., The Rise of China and India – What’s in it for Africa? (OECD, 2006), pp. 25ff; The Financial 
   Times reported in 2006 that the price of copper had hit an unprecedented $6,000 a tonne, double the average price in 
   2004 (Financial Times, 7 April 2006, p. 14). The International Herald Tribune attributes this price hike largely to 
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   copper (D. Lague, ‘China to Sell Some Copper to Battle Rising Price’, International Herald Tribune (15 November 
   2005), available from http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/11/15/business/copper.php, retrieved on 17 July 2007). 
55 Namibia Economist, 2 May 2003, available at http://www.economist.com.na/, retrieved on 15 June 2006. 
56 On their journey through DRC they are accompanied by armed convoys. Personal communication, Jan-Bart 
   Gewald, 13 October 2007. 
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A smelter at Tsumeb in north-central Namibia, operated by a UK-based company, processes 
the ore into reﬁned copper, which is then exported through Walvis Bay. As this one example 
shows, the TCC is now a means by which interconnected transnational business ventures and 
their nodal points meet. Other enterprises operating along and through the TCC involve the 
Zambian capital of Lusaka (a major consumer market and manufacturing site), the tourism 
industry at Livingstone, the salt reﬁneries, ﬁsh factories and shipping industry of Walvis Bay, 
the import of European and American fertiliser, agricultural and mining equipment, and the 
export of Zambian agricultural and timber products.57 
    The corridor is not, however, merely an all-weather transport route connecting sites of 
production, consumption and trade. It is also an integrated space of transnational governance, 
supposed to ensure the smooth conduct of private business across state boundaries without 
hindrance from governmental red tape. The Walvis Bay Corridor Group (WBCG) is the 
organisational expression of this agenda. Launched in 1998, its members are African and 
Namibian-based private and parastatal transport and logistics enterprises, SADC bodies, the 
German-African Business Association, Namibian government ministries and the Walvis Bay 
municipality.58 WBCG aims to facilitate imports and exports to and from Namibia and its 
landlocked neighbours by developing a regional network of ‘transport corridors’ converging 
on the port of Walvis Bay. Among the administrative tools WBCG has developed and lobbied 
for are free trade agreements within SADC,59 ‘one-stop border posts’,60 ‘dry ports’61 and 
‘export processing zones’.62 These are located at key points of transit along the corridor 
routes, including Katima Mulilo. In WBCG’s idealised imagination the TCC functions like a 
frictionless Teﬂon-coated pipeline, as the ‘corporate philosophy’ on their website illustrates: 
‘The Corridor Group – public and private sector in one team – co-operating to realise our 
vision – FREE FLOW OF TRADE to and from the SADC region!’63 Private enterprises and 
donor governments providing know-how and ﬁnancing are de facto the driving forces behind 
these ways of doing business in and with Africa. WBCG has received funding from the 
Swedish and German governments, the EU and SADC.64 But Namibian (and Zambian) 
government representatives are eager to participate and claim ownership. The Namibian High 
Commissioner to Zambia in June 2007 called upon ‘the private sector’ to ‘do their share’ and 
‘ensure the speedy conclusion of the Trans Caprivi Corridor and to facilitate the smooth ﬂow 
of cross-border trafﬁc [ . . . ] by utilising infrastructure that the Namibian and Zambian 
governments must put in place’.65 
    An alliance of southern African governments, investors and development aid donors has 
created a transnational space that is at least partly removed from state regulation and instead is 
supposed to ensure that market forces can reign freely. SWAPO regards projects such as 
the TCC as a major achievement in the nation-building process of a postcolonial Namibia. The 
SWAPO government’s ofﬁcial vision for Namibia’s socio-economic development stresses 
infrastructure development, direct foreign and domestic investment and rapid industrialisation 
57 Walvis Bay Corridor Group (WBCG), ‘Trade: Export, Import Commodities’, available at http://www.wbcg.com. 
   na/wbcg/tcc/tcc.htm, retrieved on 17 July 2007. 
58 WBCG, ‘Members of WBCG’, available at http://www.wbcg.com.na/wbcg/group/thegroup.htm, retrieved on 
   17 July 2007. 
59 The Namibian, 18 June 2007. 
60 The Namibian, 12 September 2006. 
61 Times of Zambia, 24 February 2006, ‘Namibia Paves Way for Zambia’s Dry Port’, available at http://www.tralac. 
   org/scripts/content.php?id¼ 4564, retrieved on 6 August 2007. 
62 See, for example, Walvis Bay Export Processing Zone, available at http://www.wbepzmc.iway.na, retrieved on 
   27 July 2007. 
63 WBCG, ‘About Us’, available at http://www.wbcg.com.na/wbcg/about/aboutus.htm, retrieved on 17 July 2007; 
   (capital letters in original). 
64 New Era, 16 December 2003. 
65 Times of Zambia, 28 June 2007. 
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in the agricultural, mineral extraction, manufacturing and tourism sectors.66 In terms of 
realpolitik, this has led to an emphasis on visible large-scale projects that are publicly justiﬁed 
by their supposed creation of large numbers of jobs.67 The national leadership consistently 
refers to projects such as the TCC to support claims that they are ‘bringing development’ to 
Caprivi and other impoverished regions and people in Namibia. Yet, at the same time, a long 
list of high-proﬁle scandals in recent years has also revealed that members of Namibia’s new 
ruling elite are extracting additional incomes from the embezzlement of public funds and more 
or less legal investments in parastatal and other companies closely associated with SWAPO 
‘comrades’. These include several direct or indirect beneﬁciaries of the TCC.68 
Living through Connections, Doing Business in a Border Boomtown 
In Katima Mulilo the winds of change are scented by diesel fumes and the smell of fresh 
cement. Secessionism is ‘out’, investment is ‘in’, and a steady stream of trucks have been 
rolling across the new bridge since May 2004.69 In the town centre, Namibians, white and 
Malaysian South Africans, Chinese and multinational corporate investors have built new 
supermarkets, banks, hardware stores, warehouses and petrol stations with long-distance 
truck facilities. Government and private investors (among them several high-proﬁle SWAPO 
members) are developing a prominent section of Katima’s Zambezi river shore into a 
waterfront tourism park with luxury lodges, shops and restaurants. Hopes of making the 
sprawling investment (whose concrete foundations are below the Zambezi’s high water 
margin) viable are pinned on the fact that, via the new bridge, the Victoria Falls are just a two- 
hour drive from Katima Mulilo. On a more modest scale, Sesheke is undergoing similar 
changes. Along the route to Livingstone, investors are buying up what used to be 
communally-held agricultural land, in particular along the Zambezi shore.70 The Danish 
government in 2006 agreed to provide funding for more road construction along the Zambezi 
further upstream.71 This was intended to pave the way for further investment in commercial 
agriculture, tourism and the timber industry in the region.72 It would also link Katima to the 
sites of recently discovered diamond and oil deposits near the Angolan border. Katima Mulilo 
is thus emerging as a regional hub, a bridgehead for business with good transport access 
where essential goods and services are available in a reliable manner (Figure 3). 
66 As laid out in the Namibian Government’s Vision 2030. http://www.npc.gov.na/vision/vision_2030bgd.htm, 
   retrieved on 25 March 2008. 
67 Examples are the now-defunct Ramatex textile factory, the failed Northland City investment scheme (see Dobler, 
   this volume), table grape plantations on the Orange River and several new uranium mining ventures. A failed plan 
   from the early 1990s for massive sugar cane production in Caprivi was recently reincarnated in a proposed N$870 
   million plantation and production plant for bio-diesel fuel by an Israeli investor. SWAPO member Chief Kisco 
   Liswani III of the Masubia Tribal Establishment lobbied strongly for government to fast-track the project which 
   was supposed to put 50,000 hectares of currently communal land under irrigation and result in 300,000 [sic] 
   permanent, plus 300,000 temporary jobs. New Era, 28 February 2008. 
68 See H. Melber, ‘Poverty, Politics, Power and Privilege: Namibia’s Black Economic Elite Formation’, in 
   H. Melber (ed.), Transitions in Namibia – Which Changes for Whom? (Uppsala, Nordic Africa Institute, 2007), 
   pp. 110 –30 for details on self-enrichment schemes involving high-level Namibian civil servants and parastatal 
   managers misappropriating public funds for the Walvis Bay export processing zone. 
69 Namibia’s Investment Newsletter reported in June 2004, ‘The mere 20 to 30 vehicles per day which braved the 
   pontoon [. . .] have now been replaced by a trafﬁc ﬂow of over 60 heavy vehicles each day. And these are but early 
   days’, Ministry of Trade and Industry, Republic of Namibia, ‘Frontiers of Commerce Expanded’, Namibia’s 
   Investment Newsletter, 5 (May 2004), p. 4. 
70 Personal communication, Fredrick Mutesa, 25 April 2008; During an interview in June 2004 the Sesheke District 
   Chief of Police offered me his assistance in case I was interested to ‘invest’ and ‘buy land’ in the area. 
71 The Post, 18 December 2006, available from http://www.postzambia.com/post-read_article. 
   php?articleId¼19629, retrieved on 17 July 2007. 
72 New Era, 27 July 2006; Barotse Development Trust 2006. Barotse Development Trust, ‘Projects’, available from 
   http://www.barotsedevelopmenttrust.com/projects.html, retrieved 29 November 2005. 
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    A look beyond Katima’s booming central business district however suggests that any 
impression of rapid ‘development’ must be set against Caprivi’s broader socio-economic 
realities. A 2006 government study states that Caprivi remains the poorest region in the 
country with a Human Poverty Index (HPI-1) of 36 compared to an overall average of 24.7 for 
Namibia. Caprivi has the country’s highest HIV prevalence rate: 43 per cent – nearly double 
the national average of 22.5 per cent.73 In the areas across Caprivi’s borders with Zambia, 
Botswana, Zimbabwe and Angola, rates are either known or estimated to be above 40 per 
cent. Some scholars and policy makers therefore regard Caprivi as a conduit for AIDS to enter 
the country.74 Infrastructure for electricity and water, as well as access to education, health 
and other services remain very limited in the rural areas of Caprivi and some parts of the 
regional capital. The Katima town council is weighed down by scandals, internal feuds and 
limited management skills. It seems incapable of collecting sufﬁcient revenues to pay its 
employees and various parastatal service providers. This has resulted in frequent shut-downs 
of water and electricity supplies affecting all local users, including the state hospital.75 
On 5 March 2008, two stories illustrating the contrasts appeared in the same edition of the 
daily New Era. The ﬁrst reported that construction work on the N$128 million Zambezi 
Waterfront Tourism Park was about to begin; the other that Katima’s hospital, schools and 
thousands of residents had been without tap water for ﬁve days (an underground pipeline had 
burst because the town’s ageing water infrastructure had not been maintained due to ‘a lack of 
ﬁnances’).76 Shanty town residents have repeatedly protested against poor municipal 
services.77 On several occasions central government has had to intervene directly to force 
administrators and their ﬁnances back on track.78 Since 2003, the key player in urban 
development in Katima Mulilo has been Luxembourg’s state donor agency, Lux 
Development. Its programmes, worth, e3.6 million, fund the renewal of the Katima Mulilo 
open market and support urban development through the formalisation of informal settlements 
in the town.79 While this has brought visible improvements for some areas and residents, the 
growth of new squatter camps on the outskirts of Katima outpaces the formalisation of the old 
ones that emerged during the apartheid era.80 Rural-urban migration has expanded from within 
Caprivi to other rural areas in northern Namibia and western Zambia. 
    The degree of intermarriage and kinship ties among the descendants of Lozi migrants 
remains very high. In search of a better life in relatively-wealthier Namibia, Zambian citizens 
have come to Caprivi for many years. Probably around several thousand are working as 
herdsmen or household maids in the rural areas, or as day labourers, sex workers and traders 
in urban businesses, bars and markets. Many residents on both sides of the borderland lead a 
cross-border lifestyle that deﬁes clear categories of formal citizenship on a daily basis, as the 
following example illustrates. Godfrey Simasiku81 runs a shop in the market of Mwandi, a 
Zambian town located 70 km from Sesheke towards Livingstone along the newly tarred 
73 Namibia National Planning Commission (Windhoek, Government Printer, 2006). 
74 For recent studies describing Caprivi as an access corridor for HIV to enter Namibia, see IRIN Plusnews, 30 May 
   2006, ‘Namibia: Curbing HIV/AIDS Along a Transport Corridor’, retrieved 10 July 2006 from http://www. 
   plusnews.org; C. Keulder and D. Lebeau, Ships, Trucks and Clubs: The Dynamics of HIV Risk Behaviour in 
   Walvis Bay, IPPR Brieﬁng Paper No. 36 (Windhoek, Institute for Public Policy Research, 2006); D. Lebeau, 
   Turning Corridors of Mobility into Corridors of Hope: Mapping the Link Between Mobility and HIV 
   Vulnerability in Namibia (Geneva, International Organisation for Migration, 2006). 
75 The Namibian, 16 October 2000; 23 July 2003. 
76 New Era, 5 March 2008, retrieved 5 March 2008 from http://www.newera.com.na/page.php?id¼5983 and http:// 
   www.newera.com.na/page.php?id¼ 5984. 
77 New Era, 16 August 2007, retrieved 16 August 2007 from http://www.newera.com.na/page.php?id¼ 3330. 
78 The Namibian, 31 May 2002; 12 December 2003, 4 June 2004, 4 August 2004. 
79 Lux Development, Namibia-Luxembourg Co-operation (Luxembourg, 2007), pp. 5, 12. 
80 Interview Michael Mudabeti, Mayor of Katima Mulilo, Katima Mulilo, 5 September 2002. 
81 I have used a pseudonym here. 
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section of the TCC (compare Figure 2). The market represents an easily accessible and 
cheap source of consumer goods for customers from Mwandi and nearby villages. People 
living in and around Schuckmannsburg, located just across the river in Namibia, also 
frequently visit Mwandi. Their Namibian dollars are a relatively stable currency that can be 
re-sold for an extra proﬁt to traders from Sesheke who need them to buy supplies across the 
border in Katima Mulilo. Mr Simasiku is in his early 30s, a priest in the Apostolic Church and 
a respected young family man. He sells a variety of food and small household items and his 
business is expanding. In 2004, Mr Simasiku built a second shop near the junction of 
Mwandi’s main street with the just-completed corridor highway. He closely follows changes 
in the prices and proﬁt margins of his merchandise. If price advantages of the Katima Mulilo- 
based wholesalers over those in Livingstone are signiﬁcant enough he becomes a part-time 
smuggler. On a typical cross-border business trip, Mr Simasiku takes Namibian dollars 
accumulated from his Namibian customers and travels to Sesheke. At the Wenela border post 
he pays the ofﬁcial fee of 500 Zambian Kwacha82 for a border pass and crosses legally into 
Namibia. In Katima he meets with his local associates and investigates the day’s transport 
options to Schuckmannsburg. Mr Simasiku then buys merchandise such as salt, soft drinks, 
cough medicine or blankets from one of the Katima wholesale dealers, loads them and 
accompanies the consignment to a place on the river banks near Schuckmannsburg. This is 
illegal, as the pass from Wenela is only valid within the Katima Mulilo municipality. Near 
Schuckmannsburg, Mr Simasiku hires a local acquaintance with a canoe. At nightfall, they 
smuggle the shipment across the border to Mwandi. The only ‘border guards’ they fear and are 
likely to encounter are hungry crocodiles and enraged hippopotami. The Schuckmannsburg 
border guards hardly ever patrol at night, the police at Mwandi never. Godfrey Simasiku then 
sleeps in his own home. To ‘legalise’ his journey he crosses back illegally to Schuckmannsburg 
the following day, travels to Katima, re-enters Zambia through Wenela and gets the ‘in’ 
stamp for his border pass. If he still has leftover Namibian currency he sells it in Sesheke before 
returning to Mwandi. As an epilogue, some of the goods transported in this operation later cross 
the Zambezi once more, in the shopping bags of Godfrey Simasiku’s Namibian customers.83 
    Mr Simasiku’s intriguing business model is similar to that of hundreds of Zambian 
citizens who earn a living from the sale of vegetables, ﬁsh and textiles at the Katima Mulilo 
open market and from the export of petrol, alcohol and soft drinks to Sesheke.84 Their 
merchandise is transported across the border by ‘human taxis’, middlemen who skilfully 
negotiate and circumvent border controls, the river’s currents and fauna. Meanwhile, the 
traders themselves enter and exit Namibia along paths demarcated by more or less ofﬁcial 
regulations. While the former know the routes in the landscape, the latter know how to use 
legal and ‘half-legal’ documents, market levies, small fees, favours and bribes to 
keep immigration, customs and town council ofﬁcials from interfering with their business.85 
Traders like Mr Simasiku have no intention of staying permanently in Namibia.86 They are 
perpetually in transit between the multiple nodes of their cross-border networks, cultivating 
private and business contacts and skilfully exploiting differences in prices, currency 
exchange rates and regulatory regimes demarcated by the border. Their daily practices 
constitute the Namibia-Zambia borderland as a transnational space in its own right. This 
space was well-established long before the arrival of the TCC, but in the few years since then 
82 ca. e1 in 2007 
83 Interview Godfrey Simasiku, Mwandi, 25 May 2004. 
84 N.M. Nickanor, M. Conteh and G. Eiseb, ‘Unpacking Huge Quantities into Smaller Units: Small-Scale Cross 
   Border Trade Between Namibia and Her Northern Neighbours’ (unpublished manuscript, Windhoek, 2007), 
   p. 23. 
85 Nickanor et al., ‘Unpacking Huge Quantities’, p. 20. 
86 Ibid., p. 20. 
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it has undergone changes that are literally as far-reaching as those brought on by the corridor. 
The new bridge and recent boom have not changed long-established life patterns completely, 
but signiﬁcantly expanded the geographic extent of Katima’s attraction.87 Taking advantage 
of the newly improved infrastructure, new commodity chains are emerging between 
producers and consumers thousands of kilometres apart. These chains are running parallel to 
sections of the TCC. 
    The Namibia-Zambia borderland is an important link, a space of transition from one trade 
regime, law enforcement regime, currency zone, and a host of other more or less ofﬁcial 
practices to another. Borderland residents who have long been engaged in cross-border trade 
ﬁnd themselves in the company of newcomers. Angolan and Zimbabwean nationals from 
up and down the Zambezi are mingling with long-distance traders from as far away as 
Malawi, Tanzania and DRC. They deal in raw diamonds from Angola, Asian textiles 
imported via east Africa, Chinese pirate DVDs, Scotch whisky, Congolese carvings, 
consumer electronics, car parts – the list is long and constantly evolving. In Katima Mulilo, 
Sesheke and the no man’s land of the Wenela border post these commodities are rarely 
consumed. They are re-packaged, re-priced, re-sold and re-loaded onwards to the next 
middle-man or woman. Katima Mulilo thus emerges as a regional hub, not only of the 
‘visible’ trafﬁc of goods, investments and people moving through the TCC, but also the 
trafﬁcking emerging in its shadows. And it is the combination of both trends that constitutes 
the ongoing transformation of Katima Mulilo into a boom town at the crossroads of two 
transnational spaces. 
    The chief of the Namibian police in Caprivi in 2004 conceded that his forces are unable to 
prevent the daily illegal border crossings and described them as an integral part of life in the 
borderland.88 Occasionally, members of the police have started a trading business of their 
own. A former chief of police in Caprivi was investigated for dealing in raw diamonds from 
western Angola. The former commander of Schuckmannsburg border post was sacked in 
2003 after his superiors learned he had been smuggling ﬁsh, television sets, radios, blankets, 
ammunition and alcohol on a large scale across the border.89 Regarding the illegal cross- 
border trade of petrol at Wenela, Nickanor et al. write: ‘The level to which Namibian and 
Zambian border authorities are ignoring the [ . . . ] situation sowed the seeds of doubt of 
possible complicity of these authorities in this illegal trade’.90 On other occasions the 
Namibian police in Caprivi have acted closer to the letter of the law and reasserted territorial 
sovereignty more vigorously. In sporadic sting operations, non-Namibian nationals have been 
rounded up and deported and unlicensed traders have been expelled from the Katima market, 
but usually not for long. Re-entering Namibia illegally is too easy, and business and work 
opportunities are too promising for many to be deterred. 
    The Caprivi police chief’s frank assessment and relaxed attitude seems pragmatic and 
appropriate considering the everyday realities of borderland life. But they also mask the fact 
that state security forces are not only passively observing the developments in the shadows of 
Katima’s boom; some cash in on new opportunities while others occasionally go beyond the 
mere threat of force. Two months after the opening of the Zambezi bridge, on 15 July 2004, 
Zambian national Francis Sikwai Musanza died instantly when struck in the abdomen by a 
bullet ﬁred by Mofat Muyandulwa, a member of the Namibian border police. Mr Musanza 
was allegedly ﬁshing illegally in Namibian waters in the Nsundwa area, not far from 
87 Compare also Zeller, ‘Chiefs, Policing and Vigilantes’. 
88 Interview, Hieronymus Goraseb, Chief Inspector of Namibian Police for Caprivi Region, Katima Mulilo, 15 
   April 2004. 
89 Zeller, ‘Chiefs, Policing and Vigilantes’, p. 96. 
90 Nickanor et al., ‘Unpacking Huge Quantities’, p. 30. 
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Schuckmannsburg. He was part of a group of eight Zambian and ﬁve Namibian nationals who 
were jointly operating a seasonal ﬁshing camp in a tributary of the Zambezi. The surviving 
Zambian nationals were arrested and charged with illegal entry into Namibia while two of the 
Namibians were charged with harbouring illegal immigrants. The police ofﬁcer faced 
disciplinary measures.91 In a separate incident on 14 January 2004 another Zambian national 
was shot and wounded by a Namibian border guard. Leon Kakoma had tried to smuggle two 
sacks of mangos across the Zambezi from Sesheke for a Zambian female operating a stall at 
the Katima Mulilo open market.92 Life in the borderland thus remains unpredictable, arbitrary 
and precarious. 
Conclusion 
The completion of the Zambezi Bridge in May 2004 at Katima Mulilo is not without irony. 
One hundred and fourteen years after its inception, the colonial utopia which motivated 
Chancellor von Caprivi’s administration to negotiate an access corridor to the interior of 
southern Africa ﬁnally came to fruition. The strategic location of the Caprivi Zipfel was 
recognised but not realised under German rule. It later became part of the costly and 
ultimately unsustainable paradigms of the apartheid state’s social engineering and security. 
Now the colonial ‘access corridor’ has become a conduit for global 21st century commerce. 
The new corridor route has put Caprivi and its regional capital ‘on the map’. A closer 
examination of how this has been achieved, and the outcomes it creates on the ground in 
Katima Mulilo suggests, however, that the recent infrastructure development and business 
boom have not strengthened the territorial sovereignty of the Namibian state over Caprivi in a 
straightforward manner. Sovereignty has instead been reconﬁgured in two ways. 
    First, the corridor route itself is physically located within the territory of Namibia and 
other states it runs through, but it is essentially ‘extra-territorial’, to a large extent governed 
by private business and development aid donor’s interests. Their priorities may coincide to 
some extent with the interests of individual Namibian state representatives of the ruling 
SWAPO party, who have business or political ‘investments’ associated with the corridor. 
The ofﬁcial version of ‘development’ is highly visible along the corridor route and the facts of 
the boom serve to support government’s political claim over the former renegade province. 
Beyond a narrowly conﬁned realm of rapidly expanding formal business activity involving a 
well-networked national and transnational elite, the effects of the TCC are already spilling 
over or trickling down to other people and places. But this ‘shadow’ side of the boom, which 
constitutes the second reconﬁguration of sovereignty, does not evolve according to the 
ofﬁcial government vision of development. The corridor has caused a boom of illegal 
business activities in the Namibia-Zambia borderland. The borderland serves as a parallel 
export processing zone for local, but increasingly also for long-distance traders. In this other 
transnational space we encounter winners who can and losers who can’t adapt to the rapid 
changes – or simply happen to be at the wrong place at the wrong time. 
    Through both processes of reconﬁguration the power of individual representatives of the 
state is enhanced but state regulatory authority is successfully by-passed. As long as the 
current boom of Katima Mulilo continues, the bustling activity may distract from the fact that 
in the margins of this ‘development’, social phenomena are in-the-making that are already 
prompting the Namibian state authorities on all levels to assert sovereignty more vigorously. 
91 During ﬁeld work in the Schuckmannsburg-Mwandi area I heard of several undocumented cases of Namibian 
   border guards physically abusing Zambian nationals they had found crossing the border. These allegations were 
   made by both Namibian and Zambian citizens. Compare Zeller, ‘Chiefs, Policing and Vigilantes’. 
92 Times of Zambia, 12 March 2004. 
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Corruptible state security members, rampant HIV infection, the inﬂux of illegal aliens, 
impoverished rural areas that continuously depend on government food aid and other 
handouts – these are the facts that already colonise the centre of the state from its margins and 
deﬁne the new ‘dangerousness’ of Caprivi. As long as these can be contained within the 
region through benevolent government intervention, and as long as the smooth ﬂow of 
commodities and investments along the TCC is not disturbed, there is no immediate impetus 
for government agents to take drastic action. But global commerce and tourism undergo 
business cycles that are entirely out of the hands of Namibian state representatives and can 
easily upset this brittle balance. Since the secessionist movement was crushed in 1999, state 
security forces have only sporadically acted to reign in or expel some of those whose 
livelihoods are dependent on the opportunities found in the margins of the boom. This may 
change, particularly once Caprivi’s social problems are no longer perceived as peripheral but 
as a threat to the foundations of the postcolonial state. When central government focuses on 
Caprivi and Katima Mulilo as a conduit and breeding ground of HIV, illegal aliens and 
contraband ﬂooding into the country, the opportunities associated with the territory will 
quickly come to be seen as a threat to national sovereignty. 
     Katima Mulilo is more than a node or stopover point in an emerging transnational extra- 
territory. People like Godfrey Simasiku are populating and thriving in the spaces and shadows 
emerging around the new transport corridor of global commerce. They transcend, but also 
creatively use, the geography of state sovereignty to ﬁnd their own solutions to pressing 
problems of day-to-day survival. The moves and manoeuvres by Godfrey Simasiku, however 
seemingly chaotic, are part of a precisely calculated transnational business venture. 
Mr Simasiku and the other smugglers, sex workers, herdsmen, and long-distance traders we 
encounter today in Katima Mulilo are investing their effort and taking risks to make use of the 
opportunities arising in a grey zone of illegal activities, which they themselves consider as 
licit.93 Their actions are not politically motivated, but state authorities have reasons to 
perceive them as a latent challenge to Namibian state sovereignty. When the current boom 
slows down or comes to an end, social strife in a hot spot like Katima Mulilo is likely to 
become an issue the state authorities will be ill-prepared for, but forced to handle more 
proactively than at the present time. At such a moment, the ‘dangerousness’ of Caprivi is 
likely to present an opportunity for ofﬁcials to assert authority through the use of state 
violence, and the exclusion from citizenship and state territory of those who make a living in 
the margins of the current boom. Given the power of the transnational interests that have 
caused the reconﬁguration of state sovereignty associated with the TCC, performing the act of 
exclusion and inscribing sovereign power onto the bodies of the excluded may be the only 
option left for Namibian ofﬁcials to re-assert their power when the boom goes bust. 
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